Markets are often characterized with firms of differing capabilities with more efficient firms licensing their technology to lesser firms. We examine the effects that the amount of the technology transferred, and the characteristics of the partner have on this licensing. We find that a partial technology transfer can be the joint-profit minimizing transfer; no transfer then is superior. However, under weakly concave demand, a complete transfer always increases joint profits so long as there are at least three firms in the industry. We also establish a "Goldilocks" condition in partner selection: it is neither too efficient nor too inefficient. Unfortunately, profitable transfers between sufficiently inefficient firms reduce welfare, while transfers from relatively efficient firms increase welfare. However, an efficient firm might not select the least efficient partner, though it is the social-welfare-maximizing partner.
Introduction
Knowledge and technical know-how is transferred between firms in many ways: through licensing, acquisition of rivals, joint ventures, etc.
1 For example, in the auto market, the joint production venture between GM and Toyota was partly motivated by giving GM the opportunity to learn "Toyota's efficient manufacturing and management methods, and to apply these techniques to other GM facilities" (Fenton 2005) . 2 An intriguing aspect of the GM-Toyota joint venture is that Toyota actually was initially in discussion with Ford before settling on GM (The Washington Post 1980) . This leads to the question of why Toyota picked GM over Ford, or over
Chrysler for that matter -three non-homogenous companies. An obvious answer is that GM was the profit-maximizing partner. This raises the issue of what are the characteristics of the optimal partner among a heterogeneous group when transferring technology through joint ventures or licensing. 3 For example, was Toyota choosing the least efficient among the three?
On the other hand, since in this case the FTC determined whether the joint venture was allowed, would have Ford or Chrysler been a better partner in terms of welfare?
A second intriguing aspect of this case is that GM's costs have decreased since, but have never matched Toyota's. In this sense, the transfer of Toyota's know-how was not complete, and most might suspect it could never have been. This also raises the issue of whether Toyota would want to control the amount of knowledge transferred to GM -could GM becoming too efficient harm Toyota on the margin more than it benefited GM? There is evidence that the joint ventures can be structured to control the amount of knowledge transferred (e.g., Roehl and Truitt 1987) . Likewise, when licensing a technology to a rival the licensor can control what technology is licensed. On the other hand, if the amount of technology that can be transferred is limited or fixed, would this affect the choice of partners or whether an agreement could be reached? As with the choice of partner, these too are questions that would normally concern an 1 A joint venture is viewed as a mechanism to transfer knowledge that cannot be done via licensing (Kogut 1988) . 2 Such cost improvements through learning the rival's knowledge were also a motivating factor in Ford's long term partnership with Mazda (Levin 1992) as well as in many other industries from similar joint ventures in the steel industry (Cohen 1990 ) to Sony's conscious strategy (Inkpen 2000) , as joint ventures are viewed as mechanisms to transfer technology (Kogut 1988) . 3 Like the costs with joint ventures, the costs of licensing technology are often quite high, limiting the number of potential partners. For example, Teece (1976) finds that the costs associated with technology transfers with licensing to be on average 19% and as much as 59% of total costs. Caves ', et al. (1983) find that " [t] he preparation and contract costs involved in transferring technology are not trivial, and they strongly qualify the public good character that economists assign to technology transfer." Astebro (2002) also finds evidence that such costs have real effects on the decision to adopt a technological innovation.
antitrust authority whose objective is to increase welfare. Surprisingly, perhaps because of the differing initial motivation, the well-developed licensing literature has not considered these questions as most work has been restricted to analyzing complete transfers in duopolies or with homogenous rivals, almost always assuming linear demand. 4, 5 In this paper we analyze a market with heterogeneous firms to determine which rival would a firm choose to license its knowledge or technology, how much would it choose to license, how limits in its ability to transfer the knowledge affects its decision and the welfare implications of these choices. Specifically, the firms compete in Cournot competition and differ in their (constant) marginal cost of production and so a technology transfer reduces the less efficient firm's marginal cost. We assume that the production decisions of the firms remain independent with any agreement. That is, we focus on the direct gains from the licensing and so abstract from any possible benefits from collusion, especially since outside of a duopoly, pairwise capacity collusion can be profitable (Salant et al. 1983) , let alone stable (Kamien and Zang 1990) . In addition, the possibility of collusion between the two firms is typically safeguarded by the conditions imposed by the competition authorities when approving the agreement.
We begin by analyzing the effects of partial transfers between two firms on joint profits.
We find that with weakly concave demand, that if the less efficient firm is sufficiently inefficient then a small technology transfer reduces profits (Proposition 3). Thus, if only small transfers are possible, we expect to see licensing between relatively similar firms and not with an inefficient firm. 6 Katz and Shapiro (1985) have shown that licensing could reduce joint profits in a duopoly if the licensor is nearly a monopolist in the market (the licensor's monopoly price is arbitrarily close to the licensee's marginal cost). Thus, any transfer would reduce the licensor's 4 In the seminal work by Katz and Shapiro (1985) , the duopolist are heterogeneous but only recently in Hernandez- Murillo and Llobet (2006) has the effects of heterogeneity been reconsidered. In this case it is in the context of asymmetric information regarding a licensee's benefit from the innovation. As the monopolist-competitive framework of Dixit and Stiglitz is used, as they note, there are no strategic effects between firms in Hernandez- Murillo and Llobet (2006) . The classics by Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Kamien et al. (1992) are exceptions to the assumption of linear demand and more recently Giebe and Wolfstetter (2007) . All three focus on optimal licensing (auction) strategies. For a recent over-view of the literature see Sen and Tauman (2007) . 5 Rockett (1990) considers which of two potential entrants an incumbent would license, but so as to deter entry. Entry decisions do not play a role in our model. Rockett (1990) and Choi (2002) consider the amount of technology to license in a duopoly, but when the licensee may use the technology to imitate or innovate in the future. 6 This also has an interesting implication regarding the "merger paradox" (i.e., that mergers are usually unprofitable): two firms could have a profitable merger under conditions that normally yield unprofitable mergers (Salant et al. 1983 ) by having the less efficient firm become even more inefficient and leaving the firms as independent divisions (Baye et al. 1996) .
near monopoly profits and hence joint profits. In contrast, our result holds for non-duopoly markets and the licensor need not have a near monopoly position (in fact, it could be quite inefficient). In other words, the cost difference between the licensor and the licensee need not be very large.
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Specializing to linear demand we are able to derive the range over which profits are decreasing in the amount of the technology transferred and the range such that technology transfers are not profitable, finding that this range can be up to eighty percent of the cost differences between the firms. Thus, a transfer with an inefficient firm would need to make that firm nearly as efficient as the transferor for it to be profitable. Another implication is that an attempted transfer that is all or nothing can be more profitable than a transfer that only transfers a fraction of the technology with certainty, even if that fraction is greater than the expected amount with the risky attempt.
Given our result that small transfers can be unprofitable, we then turn to see if any general conclusions can be made regarding complete technology transfers (i.e., the transferee's costs equal the transferor's cost). Surprisingly given proposition 3, under the assumption of weakly concave demand, we are able to show that licensing with complete technology transfer is always profitable so far as there are at least three firms in the market (proposition 4). Thus, so long as the transfers is complete (and we have an interior condition), a technology transfer is always profitable even if it is a very large transfer.
We then focus on which partner would maximize joint profits. Beginning first with complete transfers, we find that for weakly concave demand it is not the least nor the most efficient firm that maximizes joint profits (proposition 5) -the goldilocks condition. Intuitively, this result can be interpreted a follows. Licensing technology to a too inefficient partner would result in a large decrease in the market price. However, if the partner is too efficient, the transfer is small and there is little gain. So, the firm chooses a partner who is neither too efficient nor too inefficient. Instead, with a transfer of fixed amount (i.e., that causes a fixed decrease in marginal cost), the firm would choose the most efficient partner possible under strategic substitutability (proposition 6), subject to the partner being able to enjoy the full cost reduction.
Given the strong interest and control competition authorities have over licensing and 7 We show elsewhere (2009) that with more than two firms in the market a firm with nearly monopoly position may license some of its technology so as to drive out other firms.
technology transfers, we then consider the welfare implications of such transfer. Our first welfare result is that if both licenser and licensee are sufficiently inefficient and similar, then profitable transfers are welfare reducing (Proposition 7). First, this shows that Katz and Shapiro's (1985) result that in a duopoly, profitable transfers are always welfare improving does not hold when there are three or more firms. This also shows the importance of considering heterogeneous firms, since Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Sen and Tauman (2007) find that with homogenous firms, licensing always raises welfare. 8 The policy implication is that licensing between marginal firms should be discouraged. On the other hand, we are also able to obtain a condition for transfers to be welfare increasing. Specifically, when the most efficient firm makes a complete transfer, then social welfare always increases under a general weakly concave demand function (proposition 10).
Further welfare results are obtainable with linear demand. First, if the licensor has above average marginal costs, then if a small technology transfer reduces joint profits, it reduces welfare (proposition 8). Second, if the licensor is sufficiently efficient then there are welfare increasing transfers that reduce joint profits. 9 Third, when considering the choice of a partner for a complete transfer, we show that if the licensor is sufficiently efficient, then it would choose a more efficient partner than the partner that would give the highest welfare (proposition 9), which can be partially generalized to downward sloping demand (proposition 9′). The conclusion is that for a policy maker whose objective is to maximize social welfare, efficient firms should not be discouraged from licensing their technology nor restricted in the amount of technology they transfer, and if a complete transfer is possible, they should be discouraged from picking efficient partners.
In the next section we introduce the basic modeling assumptions. Section 3 examines the effect the amount of technology transferred has on profits while section 4 examines the effect of the type of partner. Section 5 contains the welfare analysis and section 6 concludes.
8 Recently, Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002) have shown that in a duopoly with price competition, licensing by means of a royalty could reduce welfare because, as they put it, "the royalty works as a collusive device." See also Shapiro (1985) . 9 Katz and Shapiro (1985) also find this is possible, but there it requires that the less efficient firm is not currently producing and only would produce with the technology transfer.
The Model
We consider the basic Cournot market structure. There is a commodity besides a numeraire good, and its inverse demand function is P(Q) which has P′(Q) < 0 for all [0 ] Q Q ∈ , . There are K firms in the market with no fixed cost of production and we will consider only equilibria in which all K firms remain active, i.e., the licensing is not potentially drastic. Each firm k's production level is denoted by q k . Firm i's profit function is written as:
This implies
We assume the strategic substitute condition throughout the paper:
This condition guarantees the uniqueness of equilibrium of this game. Finally, let C = Equilibrium total output level Q is determined by the sum of the first order conditions (1):
Differentiating the LHS of (3) with respect to Q produces,
From (3), then it follows that aggregate output is decreasing in C.//
Production Technologies and Transferability
Each firm i has its own technology of producing the commodity (the marginal cost of production is c i ), and it has the property right to its own technology (e.g., it holds a patent). Thus, firm i can sell it or some fraction of its technology (with an exclusive usage agreement), denoted T, to another firm or it can share this fraction of technology with another firm through licensing or a joint production. As discussed in the introduction, the real world instances that motivate our study lead us to focus on pair-wise agreements and to assume that the output decisions remain independent after any transfer as the independence of production decisions is usually a condition imposed by competition authorities (and collusion is profit-reducing in the Cournot setting).
We can imagine a situation where technologies that firms i and j own have complementarities (and in some cases, incompatibilities: nonsynergy case), but we assume that technologies are independent so as to focus on the pure effects of licensing. That is, if firms i and j have technologies with marginal costs c i and c j , respectively (assume c i < c j without loss of generality), then firm j's technology is worthless for firm i, while firm j can reduce its marginal cost of production by T ∈ (0, c i -c j ] by adopting firm i's technology through licensing or some agreement. That is, after the (partial) technology transfer, firm j's marginal cost is c j -T ≥ c i .
Partial Technology Transfers
Following previous work (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985) , we will assume that the two firms want to maximize joint profits. The focus here is on how technology transfers affects the joint profit between firms i and j with c i < c j . That is, how much technology do the firms want to transfer from firm i to firm j and how this affects which partner firm i would look for.
By the technology transfer, firm j's marginal cost decreases. This reduces C (aggregate marginal costs), and there will be negative externalities to other firms, since K is fixed.
However, the question at hand is how partial technology transfers affect the joint profit of the two firms. The sum of profits for firms i and j is ( )
Recalling that c i < c j , and treating T as a continuous variable (the amount of technology that is transferred from i to j), that is, the cost reduction for firm j can be made continuously, it is easy to see from (3) that the equilibrium given a transfer T is determined by
Totally differentiating this equation, we obtain
Thus, the joint profit changes from a small transfer (i.e., evaluated at T = 0) in the following manner:
Since the sign of the denominator is positive, if the sign of the numerator is positive, then we can say that joint profits increase as technology transfer T increases. We summarize this as a lemma.
Lemma 2. 
Surprisingly, the marginal impact of a technology transfer on joint profits need not be positive.
First, it is affected by the concavity of demand, i.e., the sign of P′′. Further, the signs of the contents of the first and second brackets can also take either sign. Potentially, then, the marginal technology transfer could reduce joint profits or more importantly the entire technology transfer may decrease joint profits. Since the first bracketed term can take either sign, even if demand is linear (P′′(Q) = 0), the above condition can be violated -that is, the marginal impact of the technology transfer on joint profits can be negative. As linear demand is a standard assumption in the licensing literature (see the discussion in the introduction), it is natural to begin with this case when determining conditions for technology transfers to reduce joint profits and then consider the more general case.
From above, with linear demand the condition for the marginal transfer to increase joint profits is -(P -c i ) + K(P -c j ) > 0. We can rearrange this to the more intuitive conditions that firm j's profit margin is not too small relative to the cost difference between the two firms: It immediately follows from this proposition that for the firms, it is optimal to set the transfer level at the maximum T = c i -c j when the condition holds. The condition is more likely to hold the more firms are in the market (K), the more similar are the firms (c j → c i ) and the more efficient is firm j (P -c j is large). All three turn on the harm the technology transfer causes by reducing the market price versus the benefit to the receiving firm from lower costs (greater output). First, as there are more firms in the market (K), for a given increase in firm j's output (the benefit to joint profits), the harm is spread across more firms -the other firms produce less, the "business stealing" effect -and so less relative harm to firm i. Second, the more similar are the firms, the smaller the maximum transfers and hence maximum harm (since the condition holds for all T). Finally, when firm j is sufficiently inefficient a small technology transfer creates little benefit since its output is close to zero. That is, the larger the price-cost difference (P -c j ), the greater the benefit to the licensee from receiving a small technology transfer. Katz and Shapiro (1985) have shown that in a duopoly setting an arbitrarily small technology transfer is jointly profitable when the aggregation of the strategic substitute condition holds and if the firms are sufficiently similar in costs. We see that with linear demand any size of transfer (up to making the firms equally efficient) can be profitable when our condition holds.
Further, the condition holds in non-duopoly settings and the firms need not be sufficiently similar in costs so long as either there are a large number of rivals or the licensee is sufficiently efficient (P sufficiently greater than c j ). At the end of this subsection we show how our proposition generalizes to weakly concave demand (which implies that the strategic substitute condition holds).
Potentially more interesting is the case when the condition is violated and a marginal technology transfer reduces joint profits. That is, if firm i chooses a very inferior partner (or only inferior partners are available) so that c j -c i is large and P -c j is small, then a small transfer would decrease joint profit and possibly even a complete transfer may decrease joint profits.
That is, no transfer is optimal. To determine the range of T such that transfers are unprofitable, we first solve for the equilibrium price, quantities and profits with linear demand.
Normalizing the intercept and slope (which does not affect the results) to one, with linear demand we have P(Q) = 1 -Q. Letting Q(C) denote the initial equilibrium output given starting aggregate marginal costs C from (3) we have
Before the licensing, joint profits are
Assuming that firms can choose the amount of technology to be transferred when
where the T superscript indicates a transfer has occurred. Thus, the total benefits from the technology transfer is
With these preliminary calculations we can obtain the following proposition (the proof is in the appendix).
Proposition 2. With linear demand, joint profits of firms k and j initially decrease monotonically for T ∈ (0, T) then increase monotonically for T ∈ (T, c j -c k ], if the following condition is satisfied
This implies that there is a critical value * , T T > such that the total benefit from the transfer,
Since the joint profit function is convex with respect to T, then if the firms are considering licensing, the joint profit maximizing level of transfers will either be all or nothing.
Thus, if firm i cannot make a complete transfer to firm j, specifically, if the maximum technology that it could transfer T < T*, then a licensing agreement will not be reached between the two firms.
An example may help clarify the effects here. Example 1. Consider a market with three firms (K = 3), with technologies c 1 = 0, c 2 = .2 and c 3 = .4. In a licensing agreement between firm 1 and firm 3, T ≈ .16, that is, a technology transfer that only successfully transferred forty percent of the superior firm's technology advantage would maximize the loss between the two firms. Indeed, to make such a transfer profitable would require an eighty percent of the technology advantage to be transferred (an eighty percent cost reduction for firm 3). As the cost differences between firms is usually a multifaceted affair (consider Toyota and GM), a more efficient firm may not be able to transfer the entire cost superiority, and so this could well be a binding constraint. Further, if firm 3's cost lie anywhere between .24 and .4, then a small transfer to firm 3 reduces joint profits; a licensing agreement would not be reached. Interestingly, the same relative relationship holds between firm 2 and 3: for a technology transfer to be profitable requires at least eighty percent of the technology difference to be transferred. Finally, if firm 2 were more inefficient (c 2 ≥ .29) then a small technology transfer between firm 1 and 2 would also reduce joint profits. In this case, if only a small amount of the technology were transferable, the most efficient firm would not engage in a technology transfer.// This result is also related to Katz and Shapiro (1985) who find that in a duopoly joint profits decrease with a technology transfer if the efficient firm's monopoly price is arbitrarily close to the inefficient firm's marginal cost. That is, when the firms are sufficiently different in costs so that before the transfer the efficient firm nearly drives out its rival. 10 In this case, the efficient firm loses its near monopoly position with any transfer and so it is jointly unprofitable.
Here we see from proposition 2 and the example that with linear demand unprofitable transfers can occur in non-duopoly markets and further that there are new and different conditions for a technology transfer to reduce joint profits. Specifically, the licensor need not have a near monopoly position nor even be the most efficient firm (it could even be the second most inefficient firm). First, the licensor can be very inefficient and a small transfer is still jointly unprofitable when c j is sufficiently close to P(C). Second, the licensee's cost can be significantly less than the market price and a small transfer is still jointly unprofitable when the two firms are sufficiently different in costs. At the end of this subsection we show that the former condition (c j is sufficiently close to P(C)) can be extended to weakly concave demand.
A different interpretation to proposition 2 is that under this condition the firms jointly benefit if firm i can raise firm j's costs. That is, instead of actually transferring the technology, the firms could agree to raise the less efficient firm's costs. This has an interesting implication regarding the "merger paradox" (that in Cournot settings mergers without large cost synergies are not profitable). Specifically, if the two firms merge, but keep their production decisions independent (see, e.g., Kamien and Zang 1990) and firm j's costs increase, then the merger becomes profitable. Moreover, raising a division's cost would seem to almost always be feasible.
The previous example can be used to show raising one's division's costs can make a 10 Creane and Konishi (2009) show that with more than two firms, licensing by a firm with a near monopoly position can be profitable (in contrast to Katz and Shapiro 1985) when it drives other firms out of the market. 
Complete Technology transfers
Propositions 2 and 3 show that a partial technology transfer from a firm to a sufficiently inefficient partner can reduce joint profits. In this subsection, we examine the extent these 
Transfers of Technology and the Choice of a Partner
While in the previous section we considered the effect of the amount of technology transferred has on joint profits given some partner, in this section we consider which partner would maximize joint profits. That is, for firm i, which firm j would create the greatest increase in joint profits from a technology transfer? We begin by consider the case when firm i can transfer all of its technology so that its partner's costs equals its ex post (or equivalently the amount transfer is a constant fraction of the cost difference). That is, when T = c j -c i . Hence, choosing a less efficient partner leads to a larger technology transfer. We then will consider which partner would be chosen when only a fix amount of its technology can be transferred. That is, the rival's cost is reduced by the same amount regardless of the rival chosen.
The Optimal Partner for a Complete Technology Transfer
Recall that Q(C) denotes the initial equilibrium output given starting aggregate marginal costs C from (3). Therefore, let Q(C ij ) be the equilibrium output given aggregate marginal costs C ij after firm i makes a complete transfer to firm j, i.e., C ij = C -c j + c i , and T ij denote the amount of
). The total benefit from a complete technology transfer
Let us consider which partner would maximize joint profits from a transfer of technology
Since 2P′ + P′′q i < 0 by the second order condition, the first term is negative and the second term is positive. In words, the first term is the effect of a slightly more inefficient firm being selected on the profits for the licensor and licensee after the licensee receives the transfer.
A less efficient licensee means a greater output after the transfer which harms the licensor.
Since the licensee will have marginal cost c i after the transfer the licensee's profits are the same as the licensor's after the transfer and so the licensee's profit after the transfer also decreases as a more inefficient firm is selected. The second term is the effect of a slightly more inefficient firm being selected on that firm's profit before the transfer. This is increasing in c j : a more inefficient firm has lower profits beforehand, which means a greater increase from the transfer.
Interestingly, this formula says that there is (potentially) an interior optimal. The best partner is not too close to firm i but not too far from firm i as well. The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 5. With a complete transfer, the joint-profit maximizing partner for a firm is neither too efficient nor too inefficient relative to the firm under weakly concave demand.
We note that for these conditions the number of rivals is fixed.
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This 'goldilocks' condition is intuitive: you cannot make a rival who is that efficient much more efficient. Thus, there is a benefit from picking less efficient rivals as there is a greater increase in profit from the transfer. However, you can pick too inefficient of a rival. The reason is that as you pick a more inefficient rival the price falls more, harming you as well as the rival. At the same time, when considering sufficiently inefficient firms, a slightly more inefficient firm does not have much less profits (since its output is approaching zero, i.e., marginal cost is approaching the price) and the gain from selecting a slightly more inefficient rival approaches zero. These trade-offs also exist if one considered instead which rival would bid the most for the complete technology transfer in a simple auction.
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If we restrict demand to be linear (P′′ = 0) then the joint profit maximizing licensor can be explicitly determined, as the derivative above then takes its peak at
As an example, consider a market with four firms with costs c 1 = 0, c 2 = .1, c 3 = .2 and c 4 = .3.
In this case the most jointly profitable partner for the most efficient firm is to select is the 12 A possible variation of the partial transformation case would have the fraction of technology is proportional to the technology differences, i.e., T(α) = α(c j -c i ), α∈(0,1]. However, because the fraction is proportional, the characterization is analogous to the complete technology transfer with⎯c j now depending on α. In this case, as α increases the optimal partner is always more inefficient than firm i even though with complete technology transfer firm i would never choose a sufficiently inefficient firm. 13 In this case, since the rival does not internalize the harm to the licensee a more inefficient firm would obtain the license as compared to the rival that maximizes joint profits.
intermediate cost rival (firm 3). 14 Interestingly, even though a small technology transfer to the least efficient rival (firm 4) would reduce joint profits, a complete transfer increases joint profits more than a transfer to the most efficient firm (firm 2).
The Optimal Partner for Partial Technology Transfers
We now turn to the case when firm i can only make a partial transfer. Specifically, whichever partner firm i selects, the partner gets exactly the same cost reduction: i.e., T is common to every firm j. Thus, the after transfer price is the same for any firm receiving the transfer and so the harm to the licensor is the same. The joint profit maximizing partner then is the one who benefits most from a cost reduction. The total benefits from licensing in this case is
where C T indicates aggregate costs after the transfer, i.e., C T = C -T. Taking derivative with respect to c j , Δπ T monotonically decreases (see the appendix) and so we can conclude,
Proposition 6. With a fixed amount of technology to be transferred, the firm chooses the closest partner possible under strategic substitutability.
Thus, firm i would choose the closest partner (lowest cost of possible partners) if it is profitable (and if the partner is sufficiently close to firm i, then the transfer is guaranteed to be profitable).
Proposition 6 however allows for the possibility that there is super-additivity, that is, if T > c j -c i , firm j becomes more efficient than firm i (or indeed firm j is already more efficient than firm i). This is certainly possible if firm j has some proprietorial technology that firm i does not have. On the other hand, it is readily conceivable that firm j does not have any special technology, in which case T must be constrained so that T ≤ c j -c i . Define then the most efficient firm that gets the complete amount of transfer T as 
Welfare Effects
We now investigate the effect of technology transfers on social welfare which we define as the sum of the firms' profits and consumer surplus. Since technology transfers reduce production costs, social welfare tends to increase in the amount of technology transferred. Indeed, Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that with a duopoly, licensing that increases joint profits always increases welfare (and welfare decreasing licensing always decreases joint profits). Likewise Sen and Tauman (2007) find licensing to be welfare improving under general licensing schemes. Here we extend the welfare analysis to when there are more than two firms and those firms are heterogeneous.
Despite previous results, we find that profitable licensing could reduce welfare. This possibility arises because if a very inefficient firm obtains a technology transfer that reduces its cost only slightly, social welfare is reduced because its resulting increase in production will displace the production of more efficient firms. This mechanism has already been noted by Lahiri and Ono (1988) within an industry should not be discourage from making a technology transfer to a rival and moreover should be encourage to make the technology transfer complete.
Welfare-reducing profitable licensing
To show that profitable transfer can reduce welfare, we begin by presenting Lahiri and Ono's condition for when an improvement in marginal cost of an inefficient firm reduces social welfare.
Lemma 3. (Lahiri and Ono 1988): When firm j's marginal cost (c j ) decreases, social welfare decreases if c j is sufficiently high, though consumer welfare (surplus) increases.
We now combine lemma 3 with Proposition 4 gives us a new result: that there can be profitable technology transfers that reduce total welfare though benefiting consumers.
Proposition 7: Suppose that demand is weakly concave and that there are more than two firms. Then, if firm j has sufficiently high marginal costs (c j ) and firm i's marginal cost is sufficiently close to firm j's, then welfare decreases though consumer welfare (surplus) increases by a profitable licensing between i and j.
The previous example can be used to illuminate when this can happen. Recall that in that Though this result is novel to the licensing literature, there are previous results that may at first glance appear to be similar even though they are quite distinct. First, Katz and Shapiro (1985) have shown that in a duopoly a technology transfer can reduce welfare, but only when it reduces joint profits. Hence, such transfers would never occur. In contrast, here there can be technology transfers that reduce welfare, but increase joint profits. Second, Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002) have shown that in a duopoly that profitable licensing can reduce welfare, but this requires the use of a royalty (raising the recipient's marginal cost) and only occurs in price competition. As they note, "the royalty works as a collusive device" and so reduces welfare. More generally, licensing contracts can reduce welfare through their collusive effects (Shapiro 1985 and others), which do not exist here.
We have seen that technology transfers can reduce joint profits and welfare. A natural question is the relationship between these two conditions. Since welfare decreases because the harm to aggregate profits (from the efficient firms producing less) outweighs the benefit to consumers, one might suspect that when technology transfers reduce joint profits, then it reduces welfare. To obtain more explicit results, we specialize to the case of linear demand so as to use the specific condition (5) 
A sufficient condition for this is that firm j has marginal costs (c j ) greater than
Since the market price under linear demand is P(C) = (1 + C)/(K + 1), clearly the above condition is satisfied for relatively inefficient firms.
Now we can turn to the comparative analysis. Rewriting equation (5) -the condition for a transfer to be unprofitable -as
it is simple to show that if c i ≥ C/K (i.e., above average marginal cost) then (5′) implies (6) An interesting implication of this result related to the merger paradox is that if a merger between two inefficient firms that raises the less efficient division's costs is profitable, then it also raises welfare.
Perhaps more interesting is that when firm i is sufficiently efficient, transfers that reduce joint profits can increase welfare. That is, even though a technology transfer would reduce joint profits it could still increase welfare. Roughly this is true when there are relatively few firms (small K) or relatively high aggregate costs (large C). An example will perhaps make this clearer.
Consider a market with four firms (K = 4) with costs c 1 = 0, c 2 = .15, c 3 = .2 and c 4 = .25 (C = .6).
It is straightforward to verify that a small technology transfer between the most efficient firm (firm 1) and the least efficient firm (firm 4), reduces joint profits, but increases welfare. 15 This result is also suggestive technology transfers from the most efficient firm might always be welfare increasing under certain conditions. We find that the needed condition is quite simple: that the technology transfer is complete.
We next consider which partner for firm i would maximize welfare. When considering which partner would maximize the change in joint profits (section 4.1), the choice of the partner affects the joint profits before the transfer (a less efficient partner chosen means smaller joint profits before the transfer). However, when considering which partner would maximize the increase in welfare, welfare before the transfer occurs is not affected by the choice of partner since welfare includes the sum of all firms' operating costs. For this reason, when considering welfare, the choice of a partner is equivalent to the choice of amount of technology transferred. It can be 15 The intuition behind this is as follows. If the transferring firm is relatively inefficient, then this implies all the more efficient firms are also harmed by the transfer more than the receiving firm benefits. The harm to aggregate profits is "large" (or alternatively the amount of production shift from more efficient firms to the less efficient firm is large). On the other hand, if the transferring firm is very efficient, then the harm to the other firms in the market is relatively small and so the consumer surplus benefit can outweigh the loss in aggregate profits.
shown that if the licensor is sufficiently inefficient then derivative with respect to c j is initially negative: as we know welfare can decrease with a complete technology transfer when both firms are sufficiently inefficient. A little more insightful is that since the function is convex, then if there is a partner that would increase welfare, then the least efficient partner would increase welfare the most. Specifically, it can be shown that if firm i is sufficiently efficient (c i ≈ 0), then the derivative at c j = c i is positive and so since welfare is convex in c j it is welfare optimal that firm i chooses the least efficient firm to make a complete transfer. When considering private incentives instead, we saw that for joint profit maximization there was an interior solution (proposition 5): the best partner was not too inefficient. Thus, with complete transfers the efficient firms may choose an overly efficient firm as a partner.
Proposition 9:
With linear demand, the profit maximizing partner for a sufficiently efficient firm to make a complete transfer to is more efficient than the welfare maximizing partner.
We bring to a close this subsection by considering the case of a fixed technology transfer.
We saw that the joint-profit maximizing choice would be to choose the most efficient firm possible. It turns out that in this case, the welfare calculus yields the same result. The reason is simple. First, a given reduction in aggregate marginal cost has the same effect on consumer surplus independent of the firm receiving the cost reduction. Second, the only effect this change has on aggregate profits is on the licensee's change of profits since the market price after the transfer depends only on aggregate marginal costs (and so is independent of which firm receives the transfer). However, this is the same calculation for maximizing joint profits and so the two questions yield the same answer.
Welfare-improving profitable licensing
The previous subsection provided conditions for technology transfer to reduce welfare even when such transfers are profitable. The final result though was that, with linear demand, if firm i is sufficiently efficient then a complete transfer raises welfare. The leads to the question of whether this would hold under more general demand and how efficient must firm i must be. Indeed, we can show that if firm i is the most efficient firm, then complete transfers are always welfare increasing. For this result, we need no condition on demand function (see the appendix for the proof).
Proposition 10. Suppose that the most efficient firm 1 makes a complete transfer to firm j (c 1
. Then, the social welfare improves.
Thus, a complete technology transfer by the most efficient firm always raises welfare.
Actually, from the proof in the appendix, it is clear that a complete technology transfer to the least efficient firm from the most efficient firm achieves the highest social welfare gain. Thus, we can make a weaker statement of Proposition 9 without the linear demand assumption.
Proposition 9′:
The profit maximizing partner for the most efficient firm to make a complete transfer to is more efficient than the welfare maximizing partner, since the latter is the least efficient firm.
The results here suggest that for complete transfers, policy makers may want to encourage a dominant firm in an industry that is looking to license its superiority to choose a partner less efficient than the firm would find optimal.
Conclusion
We explore technology transfers (through licensing or joint venture agreements) in a market with firms heterogeneous in cost. We begin by considering the profit maximizing amount of technology to be transferred. We find that with weakly concave demand (which includes linear demand) a partial technology transfers can be unprofitable when the receiving firm is sufficiently inefficient. Thus, if only part of the efficiency differences between firms is appropriable (so that the less efficient firm cannot be made as efficient as the superior firm) then we expect to see transfers between efficient firms only. An implication of this result is that a merger between two inefficient firms can be profitable under conditions in which they normally are not profitable (Salant, et al. 1978 and Zang 1990) if the output decisions remain independent and the less efficient firm becomes even less efficient. That is, by raising a division's costs.
We then turn to examine the case of complete transfers (i.e., the receiving firm becomes as efficient as the superior firm). Even though partial transfers can reduce joint profits, we find that under weakly concave demand, any complete technology transfer between firms increases joint profits (that is, licensing complete transfers is profitable) so long as there are at least three firms in the market. Thus, to the extent that the Toyota-GM joint venture was driven by the technology transfer, a sufficient condition for it to have been successful would have been that GM lowering its cost to Toyota's level, which recent events suggest have not occurred. If GM's cost reduction was small enough then their joint profits could well have decreased. An implication of these results is that an attempted technology transfer that will either be complete or transfers nothing with some probability is preferable to one that transfers only a partial amount with certainty, even if the expected amount of technology transferred is greater in the latter case.
We then consider which partner a firm would choose to license its technology. Our first result is that with complete transfers the optimal partner is neither too close to the firm in terms of efficiency nor too inefficient. Work by Lieberman and Dhawan (2005) suggests that GM and Ford were equally efficient at that time, while Chrysler was the least efficient (Toyota's discussions with Ford but not Chrysler then is potentially consistent with this). We then consider a transfer of a fixed amount of technology, which corresponds to the case when the firm has made an advance on a particular part of the production process (e.g., Toyota's production process). In such a case we find that the firm would engage in a transfer with the most efficient of possible partners, which at the time of the three American producers.
As the FTC had to approve the joint venture between Toyota and GM, and more generally competition authorities typically approve licensing agreements or joint ventures, it is natural to give consideration to the welfare implications of technology transfers. We find that contrary to previous results, profitable licensing may have a negative welfare effect: a technology transfer between two sufficiently inefficient firms, although profitable, is welfare reducing. Thus, competition authorities should treat with caution licensing or joint venture agreements between inefficient firms despite any innate inclination to foster competition against a firm that dominates the market. On the other hand, unprofitable licensing by a very efficient firm may be welfare improving. Turning to the welfare implications of partner selection we find if the licensor is the most efficient firm, then a complete technology transfer always raises welfare. Further, a welfare maximizer would want this firm to select a partner that is less efficient than the one that maximizes profits. Thus, competition authorities encouraging a dominant firm to license or engage in joint production with the least efficient firm may well be welfare preferable to having it choose a more similar partner or not licensing at all.
Let T* be the level of technology such that (4) is zero. Taking the derivative of the above (4), the total benefit from a technology change T, with respect to T is
1
which is the same as before when T = 0. When -(P -c i ) + K(P -c j ) < 0, the the derivative (A1) takes negative value for small T. Equating (5) to zero obtain the worst possible technology transfer T: 
By the first order conditions P − c i + P′Q < 0 and so as c j ≈ c i , 
Proposition 4. Assume interior solutions (no firm chooses zero production). Then, for any pair of firms i and j with c i < c j , then a complete technology transfer from firm i to firm j is joint profit improving, if K ≥ 3 and P′′(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q (weakly concave demand).
Proof. First note that weakly concave demand implies strategic substitutability. In order to prove the above, we use an artificial economy. This is provided only for the sake of proving the proposition. Let's denote the original equilibrium by "hat". Assume that, originally, c j is exactly the same as the market price c j =( ) P Q . We are interested in what happens to firms i and j's joint profit after the complete technology transfer. Before the technology transfer, there is essentially 1 K − firms only (firm j produces nothing).
After technology transfer, the new equilibrium aggregate output is described by
where ˆj ( 1 2 )( ( ( ))) ( ( ( )))( ( ) (1 ) ) 0
In particular, if K ≥ 3 and P′′(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q, the above condition is always satisfied. Now, we link the artificial market to the "real" market. Let us consider an artificial market in stage α. The total output level is Q(α), and firms except for j are producing q k (α). Firm j produces αq i (α) at marginal cost c i . Let us construct the actual Cournot equilibrium in which each firm produces exactly the same amount as in the artificial economy. In order to do so, we only need to find c j such that firm j optimally produce q j (α) = αq i (α). That is,
Differentiating c j with respect to α, we obtain,
This together with c j (0) = c j =( )
The remainder is straightforward. Suppose that c j
Since (1 
In particular, if K ≥ 3 and P(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q, the above condition is always satisfied.
Proof. With these firms, equilibrium output level ( )
where, as before, C is the sum of marginal costs after firm i 's technology is transferred to firm j . Totally differentiating the above, we obtain
This is positive for all α, since aggregating strategic substitutability condition obtains P′′Q + KP′ ≤ 0. Then, we have
By strategic substitutability, the coefficient is positive. Thus, if the contents of the bracket is positive, then d∏/dα > 0. Since q i = (P(Q) -c i )/-P′(Q), we have the bracketed term equaling 
First, if firm j is sufficiently inefficient (c j → P), then the second term goes to zero: a very inefficient firm is never the profit maximizing partner. Next, if firm j is sufficiently efficient (c j → c i ), the derivative must be positive. This is because we know that complete transfers are profit improving with weakly concave demand and that the change in profit when c j = c i is zero.// Proposition 6. With a fixed amount of technology to be transferred, the firm chooses the closest partner possible under strategic substitutability.
Proof. The effect on the joint profits for the licensor and licensee from the transfer is:
The critical thing to note in this case is that for the licensor it does not matter which firm received the transfer since the transfer has the same effect on aggregate marginal costs and so on the resulting price. Taking the derivative with respect to c j we obtain: 
A sufficient condition for this is that firm j has marginal costs (c j ) greater than 1 2 C K + Proof. Social welfare is written as gross consumers' benefit CB minus total production cost TC.
Gross consumers' benefit is written as 
